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Eviction, Discrimination, and Domestic Violence:




Survivors of domestic violence often suffer a wide array of physical
and psychological effects.' Common physical injuries include lacerations,
bruises, broken bones, bead injuries, and internal bleeding.2 Psychological
effects such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder are also
common.3  Additionally, many survivors face the horror of being
victimized yet again through the discriminatory practices of landlords,
housing authorities, employers, and child protective service agencies.4 At
their jobs, survivors may be disciplined or terminated for missing work as a
result of the domestic violence committed against them.5 In custody
disputes, survivors may be looked at unfavorably as unfit parents, even
when compared to the abusive parent.6  Survivors are denied the
opportunity to escape from abusive partners when they are refused
available housing because of the domestic violence committed against
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.B.A., Management Information Systems, 2004, University of Hawaii at Manoa. I would
like to thank the entire staff of the Hastings Women's Law Journal for their assistance in
finalizing this note and for their support over the last two years.
1. Michelle Rice, Ph.D., National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
Domestic Violence, http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact-shts/fsdomestic_
violence.html (last visited February 5, 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims
of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 377, 378 (2003).
5. ME. DEP'T OF LABOR & FAMILY CRISIS SERV., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS AT
WORK: How PERPETRATORS IMPACT EMPLOYMENT 4 (2005), available at http://mainegov-
images.informe.org/labor/labor-stats/publications/dvreports/survivorstudy.pdf.
6. In Brief: Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases,
NATIONAL ELECTRONIC NETWORK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (VAWnet), Oct. 30, 1998,
available at http://www.ssw.umich.edu/research/saunddan/CustodySaundersVAW-net.pdf.
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them. Survivors of domestic violence are even evicted from their own
homes because of the domestic violence committed against them. Housing
discrimination is in many ways a second level of betrayal.
In 2005, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York
investigated discriminatory practices in the Staten Island, Brooklyn, and
Queens rental markets.7 Staff members, or "testers," searched for available
units through various advertisements. 8 When a tester called to inquire
about the unit, she would first verify that the advertised unit was available.9
The tester then explained that she was a housing coordinator for a survivor-
assistance organization and that a survivor would be renting the unit. 10 The
results were disheartening. Twenty percent of those contacted voiced
"stereotypical concerns with questions and comments such as to the
potential renter's mental stability and concern for safety of the renter, other
tenants, and the housing providers themselves." ' 1 Another 27.5 percent
outright refused to rent a unit to a survivor or failed to follow up as
promised.' 2 A typical response was, "[w]e don't want no husband to come
and beat her up.'
' 3
The discrimination uncovered by the Anti-Discrimination Center is not
exclusive to New York. A 2005 survey of legal service providers around
the country found 150 documented cases of people being evicted in the past
year because of their status as a domestic violence survivor. 14 In addition,
approximately 100 people were denied housing because of their status as a
domestic violence survivor.' 5 These documented cases are compounded by
the number of victims who fail to report the discrimination against them.16
A 2002 study by the Urban Institute for the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development found that eighty-three percent of people
who believed they were victims of housing discrimination never made a
claim. 17
Having already been victimized by domestic violence and housing
discrimination, many survivors face a third blow: Homelessness. Domestic
7. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR. OF METRO N.Y., ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CENTER STUDY FINDS
SIGNIFICANT INCIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1-
2 (Aug. 2005), available at http://antibiaslaw.com/DVReport.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. Testers were instructed to follow certain practices and procedures: Testers
were not to enter the process with any preconceived notion of the outcome; they were not to
prompt or encourage discriminatory behavior; they were required to promptly generate a
report about each contact that "faithfully memorialized all that was said." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. 151 Cong. Rec. H 12075, 12094 (2005).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR. OF METRO N.Y., supra note 7, at 1.
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violence is such a prevalent cause of homelessness that forty-four percent
of the nation's mayors identified domestic violence as a primary cause of
homelessness in 2004.18 In 2003, one in three homeless women in
Minnesota was homeless as a result of domestic violence, and fifty-six
percent of homeless women in Chicago were survivors of domestic
violence.19 Those who choose not to become homeless make the difficult
decision of returning to their abusive partner.2°
This Note addresses the unfair practice of discrimination against
survivors of domestic violence in matters pertaining to housing. First, in
Part II, I will discuss the justifications used by landlords and property
owners for participating in discriminatory practices. In particular, I will
identify the potential types of liability that may arise against landlords and
show why these justifications do not warrant discrimination against
survivors. In Part III, I will discuss the current state of the laws that
directly address housing discrimination against survivors of domestic
violence. While progress in state and federal protections has been
forthcoming, I will show how, overall, they are inadequate to protect
survivors of domestic violence.
II. LANDLORD LIABILITY AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
Owners and landlords who refuse to rent to survivors of domestic
violence or who evict tenants after they become victims of domestic
violence typically voice the same concerns: The victims are endangering
the safety of other tenants 21 and are more likely to cause property damage. 22
Landlords who rent to domestic violence survivors may be subject to
various forms of liability, including negligence and breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment. Liability rests on the assumption that the barterer will
return to the premises to attack the survivor. The risk that the batterer will
return places the other tenants at risk of injury, thereby subjecting the
landlord to potential liability. However, while liability may arise when a
landlord allows a batterer to remain on the premises, the same does not
hold true when a landlord allows a survivor to remain on the premises.
18. 151 Cong. Rec. S13749, 13761 (2005). Among the cities identified are Boston,
Burlington, Denver, Detroit, Miami, Nashville, New Orleans, Norfolk, Salt Lake City, San
Antonio, Seattle, and Trenton. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES 86 (2004), available at
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/hungersurvey/2004/onlinereportHungerAndHomelessnessR
eport2004.pdf.
19. ACLU, Domestic Violence and Homelessness, http://www.aclu.org/womens
rights/violence/13276res20041026.html (last visited February 5, 2007).
20. 151 Cong. Rec. H12075, 12094 (2005).
21. 1985 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 47 (1985).
22. Wendy R. Weiser & Geoff Boehm, Housing Discrimination Against Victims of
Domestic Violence, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 708, 709 (2002).
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A. DUTY TO PROTECT TENANTS FROM THE ACTS OF A THIRD PARTY
In California, a landlord may be held liable to a tenant who is injured
as a result of the criminal acts of a third party.23 When an act of domestic
violence occurs on the premises, the argument is that the batterer has a
propensity for violence that endangers the other tenants. Therefore, the
issue becomes whether a landlord has a duty to protect his other tenants
from potential harm of the batterer. In order for the landlord to be held
liable, the tenant must prove: (1) that the landlord had a duty; (2) that the
landlord breached its duty; and (3) that the breach was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. 24
1. Existence of Duty
Generally, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person to
prevent him from causing harm to another unless a special relationship
exists that gives the person a right to protection.25 Relationships between a
common carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, business invitor and
invitee, and custodian and ward are special relationships recognized as
giving rise to a duty to control a third person.26 Whether a special
relationship exists between a landlord and tenant varies from state to state.
One group of states, including Hawaii27 and Virginia,28 holds that there
is no general duty of a landlord to protect tenants from the acts of third
persons. According to these states, the landlord and tenant relationship
falls within the general rule and imposes no special duty.29 Another group
of states, including California,30 Florida,3 and Idaho,32 takes the position
that landlords are under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenants
against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. Finally, a third group of
states, including Georgia,33 Massachusetts, 34 and New Mexico, 35 holds that
23. See Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza, 863 P.2d 207, 212 (Cal. 1993) (providing that a
landlord has a "duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary
measures").
24. Ann M., 863 P.2d at211.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
26. Id. at § 314A.
27. E.g., King v. Ilikai Props., Inc., 632 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1981).
28. E.g., Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va. 1974).
29. Tracy A. Bateman & Susan Thomas, Annotation, Landlord's Liability for
Failure to Protect Tenant From Criminal Acts of Third Person, 43 A.L.R. 5th 207, 253
(2005).
30. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d at 212 (Cal. 1993)
(providing that a landlord has a "duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas
against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of
such precautionary measures").
31. E.g., L.K. v. Water's Edge Ass'n, 532 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
32. E.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 509 (Idaho 1990).
33. E.g., Godwin v. Olshan, 288 S.E.2d 850, 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
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a landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenants against
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties in common areas or
areas over which the landlord retains control.36 Therefore, in states that do
recognize situations where a landlord has a duty to protect tenants from the
criminal acts of a third party, that duty rests on whether the harm is
foreseeable.
In California, one of the leading states in this area of the law,
37
landlords have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenants against
the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. 38 The court in Madhani v.
Cooper held that one tenant's repeated acts of assault and battery against
another tenant was sufficient to render a future attack reasonably
foreseeable. 39 In Madhani, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries when a co-
tenant threw her down a flight of stairs.4n Prior to this incident, the plaintiff
complained to the landlord about the co-tenant's harassment on at least six
different occasions n.4  The first incident occurred when the co-tenant
entered plaintiffs apartment, pushed her mother aside, and yelled
profanities at the plaintiff.42  On another occasion, the co-tenant
intentionally came toward the plaintiff and bumped into her, yelling, "Stay
away from me."4 3 The court found the plaintiffs injuries by the co-tenant
foreseeable, stating, "we do not believe a reasonably thoughtful landlord
would accept as commonplace the repeated verbal and physical abuse of
one tenant by another, but would act to put an end to such occurrence. 44
The court compared the case to Donchin v. Guerrero4 5 in which a landlord
who had knowledge of a tenant's vicious dog had a duty to get rid of the
dog or evict the tenant.4 6 The court in Madhani stated that the same
principle should apply "when it is the tenant herself who has the viciouspropensity. ' 4
According to Madhani, when a landlord has notice of a person's
''vicious propensity," a duty exists to remove that person from the
48premises. When a tenant is battered by her husband or partner, it follows
34. E.g., Whittaker v. Saraceno, 635 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Mass. 1994).
35. E.g., Rummel v. Edgemont Realty Partners, 859 P.2d 491, 493-94 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993).
36. Bateman, supra note 30.
37. Deborah J. La Fetra, A Moving Target: Property Owners' Duty to Prevent
Criminal Acts on the Premises 8 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Paper No. 834, 2005).
38. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 212.
39. Mandhani v. Cooper, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
40. Id. at 778-79.
41. Id. at 779.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 780.
45. Donchin v. Guerrero 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
46. Madhani, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780-81.
47. Id. at 781.
48. Id.
that the landlord has notice of the batterer's "vicious propensity" and will
thus have a duty to protect tenants from future harm.4 9 In Williams v.
Gorman, however, a New Jersey court held that a tenant's violent
propensities did not make it reasonably foreseeable that another tenant
would be harmed.5 °
In Gorman, the plaintiff was injured when a bullet shot by the tenant in
the unit directly above her blew a hole through the plaintiffs ceiling.5 The
bullet did not hit the plaintiff.52 However, she claimed that she suffered
injuries when the force of the blast caused her to hit her face against a
dining room chair and the floor.53 Prior to that incident, the plaintiff
complained to the landlord about a fight in the upstairs unit involving
members of the tenant's motorcycle gang.54 The plaintiff claimed she
heard heavy furniture being thrown, at which point her chandelier fell from
the ceiling and broke a glass table.55 The plaintiff also observed what she
perceived as drug traffic in and out of the upstairs apartment.
56
The plaintiff sued the landlord for negligence, arguing that her injury
from the gunshot was foreseeable in light of the tenant's prior violent
conduct.57 The court rejected the plaintiffs contention, holding that the
first incident would not cause a reasonable person to anticipate that the
tenant "would commit a criminal act by shooting through the walls or floor
of the apartment in which he resided thereby injuring another tenant. 58
The court further stated that it was not foreseeable that the tenant would
assault another tenant based on the possible drug trafficking and fighting in
the apartment. 59 Therefore, according to Gorman, a person's propensity for
violence, evidenced by his involvement in a prior fight, does not
necessarily impose a duty upon a landlord to protect tenants from harm he
may inflict.60
In states that recognize a duty to protect tenants from the criminal acts
of a third party, foreseeability that a batterer will injure another tenant is
based on the facts surrounding that particular case. Assuming, however,
that a duty does arise, the next issue is what measures the landlord must
take to fulfill his or her duty so as not to be in breach.
49. See Madhani, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 781.
50. Williams v. Gorman, 520 A.2d 761, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).







58. Id. at 765.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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2. Scope of Duty and Breach
California defines the scope of a landlord's duty to protect tenants from
the criminal activity of third parties as a balancing of the foreseeability of
the harm against the burden created by the duty.6 1 "In cases where the
burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability
may be required .... On the other hand, in cases where there are strong
policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by
simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.,
62
Therefore, the foreseeability of the criminal activity is balanced against the
"burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy of the proposed security
measures."
63
If the batterer is a tenant, the landlord's duty may require him or her to
evict the batterer.64 If the batterer is not a tenant, the landlord can probably
fulfill his or her duty by calling the police to have the batterer removed for
trespassing. 65 Where a batterer has not displayed any indication that he
will attack another tenant, the landlord's scope of duty appears to require a
simple removal of the batterer.66 While evicting the survivor will
theoretically eliminate all potential harm by the batterer (since the
assumption is that the batterer would only return to beat the survivor), a
landlord is not required to take every measure necessary to prevent harm: A
landlord is only required to take reasonable measures to prevent
foreseeable harm.67
B. BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT
An alternative theory of landlord liability is breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment. In California, as in many other states, every lease has an
implied covenant of the right to quiet enjoyment unless expressly
disclaimed by statute or the written terms of the lease.6 8 According to the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, a landlord breaches his or her obligation if he
61. Vasquez v. Residential Inv., Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
62. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
63. Id.
64. See Madhani, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780 (holding that the landlord breached his
duty by failing to warn Moore that she would be evicted or by actually instituting eviction
proceedings).
65. See id. at 781 (reciting the statements of the trial court that Moore could have
returned to the premises as a non-tenant at which time the landlord could call the police and
have her removed for trespassing).
66. See id. at 780.
67. See Pamela W. v. Millsom, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that violent criminal assaults were not similar enough and thus not sufficiently
foreseeable to impose a duty to make the premises entry-proof).
68. Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005);
Sempek v. Minarik, 264 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Neb. 1978) (quoting Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza
Shopping Center, 863 P.2d at 212).
or she interferes with a permissible use of the property by the tenant.69
Interference can be achieved through actual or constructive eviction. An
actual eviction occurs when a landlord deprives a tenant of his or her
physical possession of the property.70 A constructive eviction is defined as
a "landlord's act of making premises unfit for occupancy, often with the
result that the tenant is compelled to leave. 71
1. Are Incidents of Domestic Violence Sufficient to Constitute a
Substantial Interference?
The first issue when dealing with the covenant of quiet enjoyment is
whether an incident of domestic violence on the premises constitutes a
constructive eviction. To make a case for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, the landlord's act or omission must "substantially interfere with
a tenants' [sic] right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes
contemplated by the tenancy., 72 Minor inconveniences and annoyances are
not actionable breaches.73
Acts of domestic violence may interfere with a tenant's right to quiet
enjoyment in several ways. In particular, the domestic violence may create
noise or fear among the tenants. Courts will need to determine the extent to
which the noise or fear constitutes a substantial interference. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Blackett v. Olanoff, held that noise from
a nearby lounge "very substantially deprived" tenants of their right to quiet
enjoyment "for a substantial time., 74 In Olanoff, the noise from the lounge
consisted of amplified music of electric musical instruments and singing.75
The music usually began at 9:30 p.m. and continued until about 2:00 a.m.,
and occurred six days a week, every week.76 "The music could be heard
through the granite walls of the residential tenants' building, and was
described variously as unbelievably loud, incessant, raucous, and
penetrating. The noise interfered with conversation and prevented sleep. 77
Olanoff indicates that the substantiality and duration of the disturbance
must be considered in determining whether there is a constructive
eviction. Determination of a substantial interference will again be based
on the facts of a particular case. The disturbance in Olanoff occurred
virtually every night from 9:30 p.m. until almost 2:00 a.m. Isolated
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6.1 (1977).
70. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (8th ed. 2004).
71. Id.
72. Andrews, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6.1 cmt. e (1977).
73. Andrews, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839.
74. Blackett v. Olanoff, 358 N.E.2d 817, 818 (Mass. 1977).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 818 n. 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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incidents of domestic violence, however, are not likely to be considered a
disturbance that exists for a substantial amount of time.
2. Can the Batterer's Conduct Impose Liability on the Landlord for Breach
of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment?
The second issue is whether a landlord can breach the covenant of the
right to quiet enjoyment through the acts of a third party. The perpetrator
of the interference need not be the landlord personally. 79 "There may be an
actionable breach where substantial interference is caused by the landlord's
agent, by someone claiming under the landlord, or by a third person under
the landlord's control." 80 Thus, a landlord may be held liable for breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment for failing to curb a tenant's disruptive or
abusive conduct.8' However, landlords are not responsible for the acts of a
trespasser.
82
In the case of domestic violence, a landlord may have the authority and
duty to control violence on the premises. However, if the batterer is a
trespasser and not a tenant subject to the control of the landlord, the
landlord cannot be held liable for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment. Although removing a batterer from the premises (through
eviction or actions of trespass) may be appropriate, removing a survivor
from the premises is unwarranted and unjustified.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
LAWS AS APPLIED TO SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
A. STATE LAWS
1. Statutory Prohibition of Housing Discrimination
States vary widely on the rights afforded to survivors of domestic
violence against housing discrimination. A few states have adopted
provisions that directly prohibit housing discrimination against survivors of
domestic violence. 83 Other states do not explicitly prohibit discrimination,
but do provide domestic violence survivors with other rights.84 Finally,
states in a third category do not recognize any particular rights special to
survivors of domestic violence.
79. Andrews, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d at 839.
80. Friedman, Garcia & Hagarty, Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant, § 4:9(2005).
81. Id. at 4:9.1.
82. Sarina v. Pedrotti, 284 P. 472, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).
83. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT § 4242.2 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-2.4 (2006);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (2006).
84. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-40-107.5 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-33(J)
(2006); Wis. STAT. § 106.50(5m)(d) (2006); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 250.513(b) (2006).
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Among the states that provide full protection against housing
discrimination are North Carolina,85 Rhode Island,86 and Washington.87
These states have adopted laws that affirmatively ban housing
discrimination against domestic violence victims. 88  North Carolina's
statute reads:
A landlord shall not terminate a tenancy, fail to renew a tenancy,
refuse to enter into a rental agreement, or otherwise retaliate in the
rental of a dwelling based substantially on ... the tenant, applicant,
or a household member's status as a victim of domestic violence,
sexual assault, or stalking.89
The Rhode Island statute states, "It shall be unlawful and against public
policy to discriminate against a tenant or applicant for housing solely on
the basis that said tenant or applicant is a victim of domestic violence."
90
A few other states do not affirmatively prohibit housing discrimination
against survivors of domestic violence, but do offer some form of
protection against eviction.9' In New Mexico, domestic violence is a valid
defense to any action for possession.92 The court will not grant a landlord's
action for possession arising from an act of domestic violence if the tenant
filed for a temporary restraining order.93 If the tenant did not file for a
temporary restraining order, the court "shall have the discretion to evict the
resident accused of the violation, while allowing the tenancy of the
remainder of the residents to continue undisturbed." 94  Similarly,
Colorado,95 Wisconsin, 96 and Pennsylvania97 prohibit the eviction of
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42.2 (2006).
86. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-2.4 (2006).
87. Washington's statute reads:
A landlord may not terminate a tenancy, fail to renew a tenancy, or refuse to
enter into a rental agreement based on the tenant's or applicant's or a
household member's status as a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault,
or stalking, or based on the tenant or applicant having terminated a rental
agreement.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (2006).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42.2 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-2.4 (2006); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (2006).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42.2 (2006).
90. R.I. GEN LAWS § 34-37-2.4 (2006).
91. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-107.5 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-33(J)
(2006); WIs. STAT. § 106.50(5m)(d) (2006); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 250.513(b) (2006).
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-33(J) (2006).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. "Landlords may not evict a tenant for a substantial violation if the tenant is the
victim of domestic violence if documented by a police report or civil or emergency
protection order." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-107.5 (2006).
96. "No claim that an individual's tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the
safety of other persons or would result in substantial damage to property may be based on
the fact that a tenant has been or may be the victim of domestic abuse." WIs. STAT. §
106.50(5m)(d) (2006).
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survivors of domestic violence but have not yet adopted laws that protect
survivors from other forms of housing discrimination.
An overwhelming number of states do not protect survivors of
domestic violence from eviction or any other form of housing
discrimination. Within this class, some states such as Oregon 98 and Texas9 9
do allow victims to terminate their lease after an act of domestic violence
occurs. While this provision helps tenants who wish to break their lease in
order to escape from future violence, it does nothing for victims who have
nowhere to escape to. Legislation that would protect survivors of domestic
violence from housing discrimination has been introduced in many of the
states that have not yet achieved full protection. New York's most recent
effort, a bill prohibiting discriminatory housing practices against survivors
of domestic violence, was introduced on March 8, 2005.00 The bill
proposes to prohibit discriminatory housing practices against victims of
domestic violence.' 0' A major force behind the current bill stems from a
1985 formal opinion issued by the Attorney General.1
0 2
In 1985, the New York Attorney General addressed the following
question: "May a landlord or managing agent deny housing to a battered
woman seeking housing apart from her abuser on the presumption that the
abuser will visit the housing accommodation and endanger the safety of the
premises?"'' 0 3  The opinion first recognized that in 1983, approximately
seventy percent of the persons seeking domestic violence protective orders
were wives seeking protection from their husbands; only seven percent of
applicants were husbands seeking protection from their wives. 10 4  The
97. "Within thirty days after a judgment by a lower court arising out of a...
residential lease involving a victim of domestic violence, either party may appeal to the
court of common pleas, and the appeal by the tenant shall operate as a supersedeas only if
the tenant . . . is a victim of domestic violence." 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 250.513(b)
(2006).
98. Oregon's statute reads: "If a tenant gives a landlord at least 14 days' written
notice, with verification that the tenant has been the victim of domestic violence, sexual
assault or stalking within the 90 days preceding the date of the notice, and the notice so
requests, the landlord shall release the tenant from the rental agreement." OR. REV. STAT.
§ 90.453(2) (2006).
99. Texas' statute reads:
A tenant may terminate the tenant's rights and obligations under a lease and
may vacate the dwelling and avoid liability for future rent and any other
sums due under the lease for terminating the lease and vacating the dwelling
before the end of the lease term if the tenant.., obtains and provides the
landlord or the landlord's agent a copy of one or more of the following
orders protecting the tenant or an occupant of the dwelling: (1) a temporary
injunction... or (2) a protective order."
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016(b) (2006).
100. Assemb. 6282, 228th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
101. 2005 Bill Text NY A.B. 6282, 2005 Bill Text NY S.B. 4112.
102. 1985 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1985).
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id.
opinion next identified the argument in support of a landlord's ban on
renting to victims of domestic violence: "[N]otwithstanding any assurances
she may give, a victim of domestic violence is likely to be a target of
further abuse even after she moves into her own apartment, thereby
endangering the building's tenants."' 105 The Attorney General concluded
that housing should not be withheld from a battered woman based on the
violent conduct of a spouse or partner.'0 6 The opinion stated,
A battered woman seeking housing apart from her abuser, with no
intention of consenting to future cohabitation with him or of
permitting him to enter the dwelling, may not be prevented from
renting solely by reason of the violence previously displayed by a
third party.1
0 7
However, the opinion's apparent disapproval of discriminating against
survivors of domestic violence was qualified by a narrow application.,
8
The actual answer to the question posed was that an across-the-board ban
on renting to victims of domestic violence violated state law.' 09 Therefore,
the opinion did not apply to all acts of discrimination." 0 Instead, it only
disapproved of a broad rule that would give a landlord a legal means of
discriminating against victims of domestic violence.1"
More than twenty years later, Senate Bill 4112 (Bill 6282 in the
Assembly), is fighting its way through the legislature. The bill's stated
justification is that "[l]andlords and sellers of property should not be
permitted to discriminate against domestic violence victims based upon
assumptions about the effect that their tenancy or home ownership may




Some states have rejected proposals for affirmative prohibition of
housing discrimination and adopted lesser protections. In 2004, a bill was
introduced in Arizona that would prohibit landlords from retaliating against
a tenant after the tenant or someone on his or her behalf called the police or
other emergency assistance in response to domestic violence. 13 However,
105. 1985 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 45
106. Id.





112. Assemb. 6282, 228th Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); 4112, 228th Leg. Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2005).
113. "A landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing services or by
bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession after.., the tenant or someone
acting on the tenant's behalf has summoned police or other emergency assistance in
response to domestic violence." H. 2317, 46th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004) (introduced,
version 1/13/04).
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the bill was not adopted as introduced.' 14 Instead, the enacted version of
the bill included a prohibition on leases that included a waiver of the right
to summon a peace officer or emergency assistance for a domestic
violation, but did not include the prohibition on retaliation.'15
In sum, a vast majority of states have not yet recognized housing
discrimination against survivors of domestic violence as an illegal practice.
Some states have, at least, recognized the existence of housing
discrimination. Those states, however, have been hesitant to create an
outright ban on housing discrimination and have, instead, opted for lesser
forms of protection.
2. Other State-Court Remedies Available to Domestic Violence Survivors
Subjected to Housing Discrimination
Other remedies that may be available to domestic violence survivors
against a landlord who discriminates include retaliatory eviction and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
a. Retaliatory Eviction
Retaliatory eviction is an affirmative defense to termination
proceedings when a landlord brings the action for an improper reason,
namely in retaliation for exercising a legal right. 1 6 Generally, the defense
of retaliatory eviction is based on a tenant's legal rights to obtain
compliance with habitability." 7 In California, however, under Civil Code
section 1942.5(c), a landlord may not evict a tenant or raise his or her rent
because he or she has "lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under
the law.""l 8  The law is founded on the principle that a "landlord may
normally evict a tenant for any reason or for no reason at all, but he may
not evict for an improper reason. '1 19
Retaliatory eviction is limited, however, to cases where a landlord
evicts the survivor because of a legally protected activity. For example, the
court in Barela v. Superior Court held that the tenant's complaint to the
police was a right under the law and a legally protected activity under the
statute prohibiting retaliatory eviction. 120 Therefore, a landlord who evicts
a tenant for summoning the police after a domestic violence dispute may
have a claim of retaliatory eviction. Alternatively, a tenant may also argue
that retaliatory motive exists if the landlord evicted the tenant after the
tenant obtained a restraining order, another legal right and protected
114. H. 2317, 46th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004) (enacted, version 5/11/04).
115. H. 2317, 46th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004) (enacted, version 5/11/04).
116. S. P. Growers Ass'n. v. Rodriguez, 552 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1976).
117. Four Seas Inv. Corp. v. Int'l Hotel Tenants' Ass'n., 146 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(c) (2006).
119. Barela v. Super. Ct., 636 P.2d 582, 584 (Cal. 1981).
120. Id.
activity. The difficulty is in proving that the landlord's motive was
retaliatory in nature.
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The elements required to establish a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress include: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; and (3) severe emotional distress. 121
Extreme and outrageous conduct has been defined as behavior that is
"beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' ' 122 However, a survivor
who can prove all of these elements and succeed in a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress will also be limited because her remedy will
not prevent her eviction.
B. PUBLIC AND ASSISTED HOUSING
Until recently, the laws governing public and assisted housing favored
the discriminatory practice of housing authorities evicting tenants based on
their status as survivors of domestic violence. 23 The Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005), signed by President
Bush on January 5, 2006, was a huge victory for domestic violence
survivors and their advocates. 1
24
Prior to VAWA 2005, the Low-Income Housing Assistance Voucher
Program (Assisted Housing) and Public Housing Program statutes actually
aided in the eviction of domestic violence victims. 25 The statutes provided
a zero-tolerance policy that mandated eviction after a single incident of
criminal activity:
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which ... provide
that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants.., engaged
in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control,
shall be cause for termination of tenancy.
26
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
122. Id. at § 46 cmt. d.
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1)(6) (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f)(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2005).
124. H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1)(6) (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f)(d)(l)(B)(iii) (2005).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)()(6) (2005). A similar provision existed for assisted
housing programs:
[Diuring the term of the lease, any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in the immediate vicinity
of the premises ... engaged in by a tenant of any unit, any member of the
tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control,
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The United States Supreme Court, in Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker, held that this provision allowed landlords to
evict tenants for an incident of criminal activity, whether or not the tenant
knew, or should have known, about the activity.127  Although Rucker
involved a drug-related crime, the Court's holding was broad enough to
encompass any instance of criminal activity, including domestic
violence. 28 That is exactly how Tiffani Alvera's landlord interpreted this
ruling. 129
According to the charge of discrimination issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Tiffani Alvera's husband
assaulted her in her home on August 2, 1999.130 Ms. Alvera called the
police and her husband was arrested. 31 That same day, she obtained a
temporary restraining order, which included an order for her husband to
move out of their apartment.1 32  The management company of the
government-subsidized complex in which Ms. Alvera lived served her with
an eviction notice just two days later.' 33 The stated justification for the
eviction was "[y]ou, someone in your control, or your pet, has seriously
threatened immediately to inflict personal injury, or has inflicted
substantial personal injury upon the landlord or other tenants."'' 34  The
management company cited the August 2nd incident and later explained
that it was their policy to evict tenants who pose a threat to the safety and
well-being of other tenants ' 35 Management further argued that when one
person in the household poses a threat, the entire household is evicted.
136
VAWA 2005 specifically addresses the problems raised by the
statutory language and the Court's interpretation in Rucker by carving out
exceptions for survivors of domestic violence. 37  First, VAWA 2005
clarified that incidents of domestic violence do not constitute serious or
shall be cause for termination of tenancy.
42 U.S.C. § 1437(f)(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2005).
127. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).
128. See id.
129. See Charge of Discrimination at 5, Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Inc., HUD ALJ
No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999),
available at http://legalmomentum.org/mint/pepper/orderedlist/downloads/download.php?
file=http%3A//legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/files/alverachargeofdiscrimsigned.pdf.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 3-4.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 3-4.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id.; Determination of Reasonable Cause at 2, Alvera v. Creekside Vill. Apts.,
No.10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Seattle, Wash., Apr. 13, 2001),
available at http://legalmomentum.org/mint/pepper/orderedlist/downloads/download.php?
file=http%3A//Iegalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/files/alverareasonalblecausesigned.pdf.
136. Determination of Reasonable Cause, supra note 135, at 2.
137. Amendments to the Low-Income Housing Assistance Voucher Program, 109
P.L. 162 §§ 606(2)(B)-(C), 607 (3)-(4) (Jan. 5, 2006).
263
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repeated violations of the lease and do not constitute good cause for
terminating the tenancy. 138 Next, the zero-tolerance policy was specifically
addressed. 139  The act prohibits the termination of a tenancy based on
criminal activity engaged in by a household member, guest, or other person
under the tenant's control if the criminal activity involves domestic
violence against the tenant. 140  Thus, VAWA 2005 directly targets the
unfair actions of landlords and property management companies and
ensures that survivors of domestic violence will be protected from further
mistreatment. However, while VAWA 2005 is a huge step toward
recognizing the rights of survivors, it is limited in application. The
prohibitions only apply to tenants who live in public housing and
government-assisted housing. 141
C. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.'
142
Although the act does not explicitly protect survivors of domestic violence
from discriminatory housing practices, courts have entertained the notion
that victims may have a case for sex discrimination under the theory of
disparate treatment and/or disparate impact. 
143
1. Disparate Treatment
Plaintiffs may bring a claim under the Fair Housing Act under a theory
of disparate treatment. 44  The crucial factor in making out a case for
disparate treatment is discriminatory motive. 1
45
A prima facie case of housing discrimination is established by showing
the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the protected class;
(2) the plaintiff applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase certain
property or housing; (3) the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) the housing or
rental property remained available thereafter. 46 In the case of a victim of
domestic violence claiming housing discrimination, a plaintiff would need
to show: (1) she is a woman; (2) she applied for and was qualified to rent or
138. Id. at §§ 606(2)(B), 607(3).
139. Amendments to the Low-Income Housing Assistance Voucher Program, 109
P.L. 162 at §§ 606(2)(C), 607(4).
140. Id. at §§ 606(2)(B)-(C), 607 (3)-(4).
141. Id. at §§ 606(2)(B)-(C), 607(3)-(4).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
143. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005).
144. Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999); Gamble v. City of
Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306.
145. Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 791 (6th Cir. 1996);
Gamble, 104 F.3d at 306 (9th Cir. 1997).
146. Maki v. Laako, 88 F.3d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1996).
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purchase the property or housing in question; (3) she was rejected; and (4)
the housing or rental property remained available. 1
47
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action.1 48 If the defendant satisfies his burden, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason asserted by the
defendant is a mere pretext.
49
2. Disparate Impact
Under the disparate impact theory of sex discrimination, a plaintiff
would argue that the defendant's actions had a discriminatory effect. 5 °
Unlike disparate treatment, proof of discriminatory intent or motive is not
required to establish a claim of disparate impact; all that is required is a
showing that the policy or practice has a discriminatory effect. 5 ' In
particular, a prima facie case is established by showing that the defendant's
practice actually or predictably results in discrimination. 5 2 Various factors
may be considered to determine whether a prima facie case has been
established including: (1) the strength of plaintiffs showing of
discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the
defendant's interest in taking the action in question; and (4) whether the
plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing or
merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property
owners who wish to provide such housing.
53
In the case of victims of domestic violence, there is a discriminatory
effect on women because women are more likely than men to be victims of
domestic violence. 54 The statistical data is overwhelming: 86.6 percent of
violent acts committed by intimate partners from 1993 to 1998 were
committed against women; 55 in 1998, women were more than five times
more likely than men to be victims of intimate partner violence; 56 women
are 7.4 times more likely than men to be victims of domestic violence in
rental homes; 157 in urban areas, women are 5.9 times more likely to be
147. Weiser, supra note 22 at 713.
148. Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 306.
151. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291
(7th Cir. 1977); Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 1999); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 1996).
152. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998).
153. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
154. Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678.
155. Weiser, supra note 22, at 710.
156. Id.
157. Weiser, supra note 22, at 711.
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victims of domestic violence;158 in suburban areas, 5.6 times as likely; and
in rural areas, 7.4 times as likely. 59
3. Cases Asserting Disparate Impact
One of the first attempts to employ the disparate impact theory to
domestic violence survivors was Alvera v. C.B.M Group, Inc.,60  Ms.
Alvera, whose eviction was described supra, filed a complaint with HUD
after being evicted from her home.161 Upon an investigation, HUD issued a
finding of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act.'
62
According to HUD, since women constitute a vast majority of domestic
violence victims, policies targeted at domestic violence survivors have a
disproportionate impact on women.' 63  Therefore, HUD reasoned, such
policies constitute sex discrimination and are illegal under the Fair Housing
Act. 164
As a result, HUD brought suit against the management company in
federal court and Ms. Alvera subsequently intervened.1 65 Ms. Alvera's
complaint alleged that C.B.M. Group's practice of evicting victims of
domestic violence imposed a disparate impact on women.' 66 The parties
settled the matter and C.B.M. Group agreed not to evict or discriminate
against tenants because of the domestic violence committed against
them.167 C.B.M Group also agreed to revise all of its manuals, handbooks,
and polices to reflect the settlement terms and educate its staff on the new
policy. 16
8
Alvera established the groundwork for future cases to argue that
policies and practices of evicting and refusing rentals to victims of
domestic violence violate federal law. On March 10, 2005, another court
took a step toward recognizing domestic violence survivors' rights. A
district court in Vermont had before it another case involving eviction of a
tenant based on the domestic violence committed against her.1 69 The facts
of the case were similar to others that came before it. On October 15,
2003, Quinn Bouley was beaten in her home by her husband, Daniel
158. Weiser, supra note 22, at 711.
159. Id.
160. Complaint in Intervention, Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Inc., No. 01-857-PA (D.
Or. 2001), available at http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/files/alveracomplaint
signed.pdf.
161. Charge of Discrimination, supra note 129, at 1.
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. at 6-7.
165. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 160, at 4.
166. Id. at 9-10.
167. Consent Decree at 5, Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Inc., No. 01-857-PA (D. Or.
2001), available at http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/files/alveraconsent
decree.pdf.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675.
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Swedo. 170 Ms. Bouley called the police and her husband eventually pled
guilty to several criminal charges, including assault.
17
Just three days after the assault, Ms. Bouley's landlord paid her a
visit. 72  According to Ms. Bouley, her landlord attempted to discuss
religion and Christianity with her before declaring "I guess I can't do
anything here."'173 After their discussion, the landlord wrote a letter to Ms.
Bouley in which she asked her to leave the apartment by November 30,
2003.174 The letter pointed out one of the lease provisions: "Tenant will not
use or allow said premises or any part thereof to be used for unlawful
purposes, in any noisy, boisterous or any other manner offensive to any
other occupant of the building."'7 5 The letter further stated that "[o]ther
tenants, and now myself included, feel fearful of the violent behaviors
expressed."1
76
Ms. Bouley brought suit against her landlord, alleging unlawful
termination of her lease under the Fair Housing Act on the basis of sex and
religion. 177 The complaint alleged, "the termination was initiated because
she was a victim of domestic violence.' 78  Defendant's motion for
summary judgment and plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment
were both denied. 179  The court held that there were material factual
disputes because Ms. Bouley established a prima facie case of
discrimination.' 80 The court further stated, "the timing of the eviction, as
well as reasonable inferences which a jury could draw from some of the
statements in the eviction letter, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude
that the real reason for the defendant's actions was unlawful
discrimination."18
The ruling in Bouley is important because it is the first time a court has
recognized the validity of disparate impact claims as applied to survivors of
domestic violence.182  Emily Martin, a staff attorney with the ACLU
Women's Rights Project, explained,
This important ruling will ensure that when a woman is victimized
by domestic violence, she is not doubly victimized with eviction as
a result .... For the first time, a court has ruled that under the Fair











181. Id. The case was settled before it went to trial.
182. See id.
Housing Act, a woman cannot be thrown out of her home because
she was battered."
' 183
While Bouley is an important ruling because it brings many domestic
violence survivors closer to achieving protections under the Fair Housing
Act, many limitations still exist. First, the precedential value is minimal
since the opinion was made at the district court level on a motion for
summary judgment. Second, the theory itself is limiting because, by
nature, it only applies to women subject to domestic violence. While
women are an overwhelming majority of domestic violence victims,
however, male victims do exist. 
184
IV. CONCLUSION
Discriminatory housing practices against survivors of domestic
violence are unjust and unwarranted. The justification that a landlord is
subjecting herself to liability to other tenants is troublesome. As discussed,
a landlord may be liable for failing to remove the dangerous batterer from
the premises, but the same cannot be said about the landlord's failure to
remove the victim. Removing the victim from the premises is an extreme
measure that is beyond the scope of the landlord's obligation.
Unfortunately, many of the laws are currently in favor of landlords who
discriminate against survivors of domestic violence. The states seem to be
extremely slow to address the issue. Only a few states prohibit housing
discrimination against persons because of their status as a domestic
violence victim. An overwhelming number of states provide no protection
whatsoever. Although Congress has declared, through the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2005, that the unfair practice of
discriminating against victims of domestic violence in public and assisted
housing will no longer be an acceptable practice, federal laws outside of the
scope of VAWA 2005 are not as clear. Although the Vermont District
Court's ruling in Bouley is another step in recognizing the rights of
domestic violence survivors, many barriers remain. In order to achieve full
protection for survivors of domestic violence against housing
discrimination, Congress should add language into the Fair Housing Act
that includes survivors of domestic violence as a protected class. Only then
will all survivors of domestic violence be protected against unfair and
unjust discriminatory rental practices.
183. ACLU, ACLU Hails Ruling That Fair Housing Act Prohibits Discrimination
Against Victims of Domestic Violence (2005), http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/
13219prs20050418.html.
184. An estimated 103,220 males were victimized by domestic violence in 2001.
Marc Dubin, Men As Victims of Domestic Violence, Communities Against Violence
Network (2004), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/MenAsVictimsoflntimate
Violence.pdf.
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